Skip to main content

The Way We Live - Ethics


Ethics
  1. Virtue is not absolute or an end in itself. All good and evil consists in sensation.
  2. Pleasure is the guide of life.
  3. By pleasure we mean all experience that is not painful.
  4. Life is desirable, but unlimited time contains no greater pleasure than limited time.

The goal of human life is not virtue or piety but a life of happiness in which pleasure predominates over pain.

As if Epicurus had not sufficiently shocked conventional sensibilities by dismissing the existence of supernatural gods, and rejecting the pursuit of virtue as an end in itself, Epicurus tripled down on his philosophic revolution by holding that "Pleasure" is not something disreputable, but is indeed the Guide of life. Pointing out that in a universe in which there are no supernatural gods or absolute standards of virtue, it is still necessary to determine how we should live. Epicurus of course looked to Nature, and saw that Nature gives living beings only Pleasure and Pain by which to determine what to choose and what to avoid

Flagrantly disregarding the wrath of the orthodox, Epicurus proclaimed Nature quite literally gave humanity "nothing" but Pleasure and Pain as guides. While there are many shades of feeling, all of them resolve down to being categorized pleasurable or painful, and there are no in-between, mixed, or third alternatives. As Epicurus' biographer summarized, "The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“ (Diogenes Laertius 10:34)

Epicurus did not consider this to be wordplay or wishful thinking, but the foundation on which to erect the highest and best way of life. Epicurean philosophy always looks to Nature rather than to wishful thinking, and so the Epicureans taught: "Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that Nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain? (Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends 1:30)

  1. Citations:
    1. As to the definition of Pleasure, see the following citations and the related answer in the FAQ List:
      1. Pleasure is one of the feelings, of which there are only two - pleasure and pain:
        1. Diogenes Laertius 10:34 : ”/The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“/
        2. On Ends 1:30 : ”/Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?/
      2. Given that there are only two feelings, you are feeling one or the other at all times if you are feeling anything at all:
        1. On Ends 1:38: Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
      3. As to pleasure and pain being separate and unmixed in any particular feeling:
        1. PD03 : ”/The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once/ .“
      4. All of those taken together show that Epicurus did not limit pleasure to what we generally think of as sensory stimulation, but included within pleasure all states of awareness of life that are not felt to be painful. You can see an explicit example of that here in regard to discussion of one's hand in its normal state of affairs, whenever it is not in some affirmative pain:
        1. On Ends 1:39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
      5. This position is asserted by comparing the conditions of two people who are not in pain, but who are seemingly in very different conditions: A host at a party who is pouring wine to a guest who is drinking it. Here is the example:
        1. On Ends 2:16 : "This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?" [Torquatus objects to the question as quibbling but the implicit answer is "yes" based on the condition of "not being thirsty" and "the thirsty man who drinks" both being conditions of pleasure.”]
      6. This means that Epicurus was defining all conditions of awareness where pain is not present to be pleasure. It's significant to remember "conditions of awareness" because he is not saying that a rock, which is not feeling pain, to be feeling pleasure. Only the living can feel pleasure or pain, but when you and aware of your condition all of your feelings can be categorized as either painful or pleasurable. You can see this sweeping categorization stated specifically here:
        1. On Ends 2:9 : Cicero: "...[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'" Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be."
        2. On Ends 2:11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible."
      7. This is how Epicurus can say that the wise man is continuously feeling pleasure, and how he defines the absence of pain as the highest pleasure. He is not talking about the most intense stimulation, he is talking philosophically about the most pure and complete condition of pleasure where pleasure is defined as a condition where absolutely all pain is gone. The wise man is about to consider this condition to be the most complete pleasure even though it is not the most intense stimulation:
        1. On Ends 1:56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
        2. On Ends 1:62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool's life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
  2. As to Pleasure being the guide of life:
    1. Lucretius Book Two [167]:
      1. Munro: "But some in opposition to this, ignorant of matter, believe that nature cannot without the providence of the gods, in such nice conformity to the ways of men, vary the seasons of the year and bring forth crops, aye and all the other things, which divine pleasure, the guide of life, prompts men to approach, escorting them in person and enticing them by her fondlings to continue their races through the arts of Venus, that mankind may not come to an end."
      2. Rouse: "But some in opposition to this, knowing nothing of matter, believe that without the gods' power nature cannot with so exact conformity to the plans of mankind change the seasons of the year, and produce crops, and in a word all else which divine pleasure, the guide of life, persuades men to approach, herself leading them and coaxing them, through the ways of Venus, to beget their generations, that the human race may not come to an end."
      3. Humphries: "Some people do not know how matter works. They think that nature needs the will of the gods to fit the seasons of the year so nicely to human needs, to bring to birth the crops And other blessings, which our guide to life, the radiance of pleasure, makes us crave through Venus' agency."
    2. Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus [129]:
      1. Bailey: [129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.
  3. Notes: There is no higher good than pleasure, no greater evil than pain.

2. The Term "Pleasure" Does Not Include Only Physical And Mental Stimulation, But All Types Of Normal, Healthy, and Non-Painful Experience.

It is proper to divide all experience between those that are pleasurable and those that are painful. Life itself is desirable, and therefore all experiences which are not painful are rightly considered to be pleasurable.

One might think that stirring philosophers, priests, and politicians to exasperation on the topics of "Gods," and "Virtue" would be enough of a revolution for any one philosopher. But Epicurus's commitment to the truth led him to drive forward to correct the erroneous view of "Pleasure" as well. While virtually everyone before him had properly understood "pleasure" as including sensory stimulation, Epicurus saw this definition as perversely narrow. Epicurus therefore turned to clarifying how the term "pleasure" properly applies to more than sensory stimulation, just as the term "gods" properly applies only to non-supernatural beings.

Epicurus realized that since Nature has given us only two feelings, if we are alive and feeling anything at all we then are feeling one or the other of the two. That means if we are not feeling pain, what we are feeling is in fact pleasure. This means that "Pleasure" involves much more than the sensory stimulation, which we have been trained by priests and virtue-based philosophers to consider the only meaning of the term. Once we understand that all experiences in life that are not painful are rightly considered to be pleasurable, Epicurus taught us that we can then use the term "Absence of Pain" as conveying exactly the same meaning as "Pleasure." The benefit of this perspective is that Pleasure be comes something that is widely available through a myriad of ways of life that do not require great pain to experience. Pleasure becomes a workable term to describe the goal of life, and a life of continuous pleasure in which pleasures predominate over pain becomes possible for all but the very few who face extreme circumstances (and even they need not face more pain than pleasure indefinitely.)

Just as we should understand "gods" to refer to living beings who are blessed and imperishable, and "virtue" to refer to actions which lead to happiness, we should understand "pleasure" to refer to all experiences of life that are not painful. Torquatus preserves for us this explanation: "Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“ (On Ends 1:38)

Find out more in our page dedicated to The Epicurean View of Pleasure, our Ethics Forum, our Wiki, and our Discussion Guide. Listen to our Special Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 269 devoted to this topic.

  1. Citations:
    1. Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
    2. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
    3. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
    4. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
    5. On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: "...[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'" Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be."
    6. On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the greatest, beyond which none greater can possibly be." [Plane idem, inquit, et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest. (Cic. Fin. 2.11)]
    7. On Ends Book Two, 16 : "This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?"

Question To Explore: Did Epicurus share the Cyreniac view that identified pleasure with "smooth motion?" And did Epicurus equate pain with "rough motion" in the sense of "turbulence?"

The authorities appear to confine the reference to "smooth motion" to the Cyreniacs, and to interpret the Diogenes Laertius reference to kinetic and katastematic pleasures as rejecting this relationship. Is that necessarily so, however? Need to verify these two alleged citations as they come from Chatgpt:

  1. Diogenes Laertius 2.86–87 (Cyrenaics): “They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth motion, the latter a rough motion….”
  2. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.215 (on Cyrenaics): “Cyrenaic doctrine… says that the End is pleasure and the smooth motion of the flesh.”

Lucretius references to roughness:

  1. De Rerum Natura 2.434–441: when atoms with “hooked” shapes entangle, they produce aspera tactu (“rough to the touch”), which he associates with bitterness and pain in taste and bodily sensation.
  2. DRN 2.447–452: smooth, round atoms yield gentle, pleasant sensations, while rough, barbed atoms yield harsh and painful ones.
  3. DRN 4.637–640: in discussing sensations of touch, “aspera tactu” again denotes what produces pain, as opposed to smoothness producing delight.

3. The Wise Man is Always Happy Because He Is Always Able To Find More Reason For Joy Than For Vexation.

Everyone experiences pain in life, but the wise man who understands the true nature of pleasure is able to find more pleasure than pain and therefore finds life to be desirable.

4. Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time.

Continuation of life is desirable because it brings additional pleasures, but the reasoning mind understands that additional pleasure can never be greater in kind than the pleasure which we experience when pain is totally absent. The elimination of pain from our experience does not require unlimited time, so the wise man recognizes that the additional pleasures in a life of unlimited time are not greater in kind than those which we experience in limited time.

As we close this list of some of Epicurus's most important doctrines, by now it should be no surprise that Epicurus held that life is very desirable. How could he reason otherwise, given that life is a necessity for the experience of pleasure, and pleasure is what Nature has given us as the goal to pursue? But Epicurus knew that humanity is not only fearful of death, but that we covet so strongly the possibility of living forever that we are constantly tempted by mystical claims offering us false promises of eternal life. Epicurus saw that he needed to answer that challenge, and deal with the concern that the inevitable death of our friends and ourselves constitutes a stain on life which forever spoils our happiness. Such a negative view of life was unacceptable to Epicurus, and he pointed out that death in fact does not deprive us of nearly so much as we think it does.

The observation that pleasure cannot be made more complete than complete (than when we experience nothing but pleasure without any adulteration of pain) leads us to realize that Infinite Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than A Limited Time. This is because while it is certainly true that pleasure is greater in duration when we live longer, pleasure cannot be made more complete than complete, and duration is not the only factor involved in measuring pleasure. Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus that the wise man at a banquet choose not the most food, but the best, and held that our desire should not be for the longest life, but the most pleasant. The determination of what is "most pleasant" is not an objective measurement, but instead must take into account all circumstances of life, including not only duration but also the intensity and part of the body affected by pleasure and pain. If we take Epicurus' advice to heart, we see that nothing can be made more complete than that which is complete, and that "variation" - or the continuous adding-on of new pleasurable experiences, cannot make our lives more complete any more than continuously adding water to a jar can make the jar hold more water.

Epicurus explains to us that his philosophy allows us to see that no matter how long we live, unlimited time can contain no "greater" pleasure than limited time. This is because time (duration) is only one aspect of pleasure. It makes no more sense for us to seek the longest time of life as the greatest pleasure as it would for us to measure the largest quantity of food at a banquet as being the best way to eat. While time is a relevant dimension, time is not at all the complete picture of pleasure, because pleasure involves not just time but intensity, and the part of the our experience that is affected; and in the end the "best" pleasure is a subjective assessment. Epicurus tells us we can see this by considering the person at a banquet, as already mentioned. Epicurus wrote to Menoeceus that the wise man at a banquet will choose not the most food, but the best food, and held that our desire should not be for the longest life, but the most pleasant life.

When you remember the Epicurean worldview that there is no supernatural god, no absolute virtue or right and wrong to which we must conform, we can see that the decision as to what is the best life - the most complete life for us - is a matter for us to decide, and that time is neither the most important factor nor the determiner of our decision. Epicurus teaches us to compare our lives to a banquet, or to a jar that we are filling with water. What we should want to do is not to eat the most food, or continue pouring water into the jar after it is full, but to see that the "fullness of pleasure" and the completeness of life is something that we can retain despite our limited lifespans. No jar can be filled more full than full, and no life can be made more complete than complete: once we see that our target is a "complete" life, then "variation" - or the continuous adding-on of new pleasurable experiences -- does not make the experience any more pleasant. And since it is pleasure that Nature gives us as our goal, Epicurean philosophy gives us a fighting chance - if we work to understand it and apply it properly - to consider our lives to be complete and in no need of unlimited time.

Citations:

  1. PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.
  2. Letter to Menoeceus 126: "And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well."
  3. PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.
  4. PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.
  5. PD21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.
  6. Notes:

5. The Virtues Are The Tools For Finding Happiness Through Pleasure; The Virtues Are Not Absolute Or Ends In Themselves.

Only pleasure is desirable in and of itself. The virtues are tools for obtaining pleasure and a life of happiness, and the virtues are valuable only for the pleasure that they bring, not as goals in themselves.

Skepticism and Determinism do not exhaust the list of lies and errors plaguing humanity. Epicurus saw that false priests and philosophers have erected a false ideal - "virtue" - as the goal of life. Epicurean philosophy has shocked the sensibilities of conventional thinkers for two thousand years by committing itself boldly to the conclusion that "virtue" is not absolute or an end in itself, and that Nature alone provides us the proper guide of life.

As with "gods," Epicurus held that "virtue" is a useful concept, but one that has been drastically misunderstood. True "virtue" is not something given by divine revelation, or through logical analysis of ideal forms, but is instead simply a set of tools for living the best life possible. Epicurus held that virtue is not the same for all people, or the same at all times and places, but that instead what is virtuous varies with circumstance, according to whether the action is instrumental for achieving happiness. Good and evil are not absolutes, but instead consist in sensation, as Epicurus explained to Menoeceus: " "Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality." (124)

Likewise, even something as highly regarded as justice is not absolute, but observable only in practical effects: "In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all." (PD36)

  1. Citations:

    1. Letter to Menoeceus [124]
      1. Bailey: "Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality."
      2. Hicks: "Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality."
      3. Inwood-Gerson: "Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for immortality."
      4. Epicurus Wiki (Epicurism.info): ” Accustom yourself to thinking that death is no concern to us. All things good and bad are experienced through sensation, but sensation ceases at death. So death is nothing to us, and to know the truth of this makes a mortal life happy -- not by adding infinite time, but by removing the desire for immortality.”
      5. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 33
        1. Bailey: “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.
      6. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 36
        1. Bailey: "In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all."
      7. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 37
        1. Bailey: "Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts."
      8. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 38:
        1. Bailey: "Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage."
  2. Citations:

    1. Letter to Menoeceus [124]
      1. Bailey: "Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality."
      2. Hicks: "Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality."
      3. Inwood-Gerson: "Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a correct knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time [to life] but by removing the longing for immortality."
      4. Epicurus Wiki (Epicurism.info): ” Accustom yourself to thinking that death is no concern to us. All things good and bad are experienced through sensation, but sensation ceases at death. So death is nothing to us, and to know the truth of this makes a mortal life happy -- not by adding infinite time, but by removing the desire for immortality.”
      5. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 33
        1. Bailey: “Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.
      6. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 36
        1. Bailey: "In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all."
      7. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 37
        1. Bailey: "Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts."
      8. Epicurus' Principal Doctrine 38:
        1. Bailey: "Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage."

Wisdom

Temperance (Self-Control)

Courage

Justice

Honesty

Faith (Confidence)

Friendship

Suavity

Consideration

Hope

Gratitude

The Question of "Katastematic vs Kinetic Pleasure"

See "Epicurus On Pleasure," by Boris Nikolsy, for an explanation of this issue and a proposed resolution based on the work of Gosling & Taylor in "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Key Takeaways:

  1. Nature gives us nothing other than pleasure and pain as guides to determine what to choose and avoid, and so we conclude that all "good" and "evil" comes to us through sensation.

  2. If we are alive and experience anything at all, that experience can be considered to be either pleasure or pain. There is no neutral or in-between feeling, because the experience of living without pain is pleasurable. While we can feel both pleasure and pain at the same time in different aspects of our experience, when we feel pleasure in that aspect of experience, we feel no pain in that aspect, and the reverse is true also. This means that the normal experiences of life where pain is not present are pleasurable, and thus that pleasure is the normal state of life and in most cases easy to obtain.

  3. The most desirable life is that in which we are experiencing only pleasures without any accompaniment of pains. While pain is difficult to avoid, and must sometimes be chosen, pain is by nature generally either manageable, if of long duration, or brief, if of high intensity, and thus unmanageable and intense pain is not to be feared.

  4. In a general sense we use the word "Pleasure" to describe what nature tells us to pursue and "Pain" to describe what nature tells us to avoid, but in the service of Pleasure we sometimes choose an immediate pain and avoid an immediate pleasure when the outcome of our choice will lead to greater pleasure as a result.

  5. In the selection of pleasures we also do not necessarily select those which are longest lasting, but instead we select those that are the most pleasant.

  6. No pleasure is intrinsically "bad" or "evil," but the desire for some pleasures produces more pain than pleasure, and such desires should be avoided.

  7. While all pleasure is desirable and all pain is undesirable prudence in choosing and avoiding involves primarily asking the question: "What will happen to me if I pursue this course of action?"

  8. It is also useful to ask whether the desire involves matters which are natural or necessary, with the principle of the distinction being that those things that are necessary are satisfied without much trouble or effort, since nature herself makes such wealth as will satisfy her both easy of access and moderate in amount, but as to those things that are neither necessary nor natural it is not possible to discover any boundary or limit.

  9. In human life, pain is generally either manageable, if of long duration, or brief, if of high intensity, and thus unmanageable and intense pain is not to be feared.

  10. Virtue is not an end in itself. Nature provides pleasure and pain as guides for choice and avoidance, but Nature does not provide absolute standards of goodness, virtue, piety, reason, or justice that apply to all people at all times and all places. Those things we think of as virtuous are good are choiceworthy only insofar as they contribute to bringing pleasure or avoiding pain.

  11. There is no heaven or hell after death in which to experience reward or punishment. Life is short, and we should not put postpone pursuing pleasure while we can.

  12. Because atoms can swerve, humans and other intelligent beings are not subject to complete determinism, and their lives are affected by their choices and avoidances. It would be better to commit the error of believing in a false religion than to commit the error of considering oneself to be a slave to hard determinism.

  1. And so while we live, let neither the young be slow to seek wisdom, nor the old weary in the search of it. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  2. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness has not yet come, or that it is now no more. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  3. But some men argue that happiness is not the goal of life, and that there is some particular final and ultimate good, an End to which all other things are means, while not itself a means to anything else. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  4. But we that it is Pleasure which is our first and kindred good, the alpha and omega of a blessed life, and that all Pleasure is good. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  5. And so the "greatest good" is that which brings about unsurpassable joy, such as the bare escape from some dreadful calamity. [(Plutarch - Epicurean Fragment)]

  6. And this is the nature of 'the good,' if one apprehends it rightly, and stands by his finding, and does not go on walking round and round, harping uselessly on the meaning of 'good.' [(Plutarch - Epicurean Fragment)]

  7. And by this we mean that pleasurable living is the ultimate end prescribed by Nature. If you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions to this end, but instead of this you turn to some other end, your actions will not be consistent with your goal. [(Epicurus - Principal Doctrine 25)]

  8. For we see that every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in pleasure, while it recoils from pain, and so far as possible avoids it. This every young animal does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  9. It is pleasure that fills the sea with ships and the lands with corn, and by pleasure is every kind of living thing conceived, rising up to behold the light of the sun. [(Lucretius Book 1)]

  10. And in the pleasure of spring the birds take flight, the wild herds bound over green pastures and swim the rapid rivers, each in turn following the charms of pleasure with desire leading them on to continue their races. [(Lucretius Book 1)]

  11. The proof that pleasure is our guide of life is more luminous than daylight itself. Our evidence is derived entirely from Nature's sources, and rests firmly for confirmation on the unbiased and unimpeachable evidence of the senses. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  12. Lisping babies, even dumb animals, prompted by Nature's teaching, can almost find the voice to proclaim to us that there is no welfare but pleasure, no hardship but pain, and their judgment in these matters is neither sophistic nor biased. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  13. Thus there is no necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain is to be avoided. These facts are perceived by the senses, in the same way that we perceive that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey is sweet. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  14. If we were to strip a man of all sensation, nothing would remain of his life. It therefore follows that Nature herself, through these faculties of sensation, is the judge of that which is in accord with or contrary to nature. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  15. And what faculty does Nature grant for perception and judgment of that which is to be desired and avoided besides pleasure and pain? [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  16. None of this needs to be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to it. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  17. For there is a difference between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder. Syllogistic reasoning is appropriate for abstract and hidden matters, but mere observation is all that is necessary to establish facts which are obvious and evident. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  18. Nevertheless, some men use syllogistic reasoning to argue that pleasurable living is not the goal of life. They argue that "the good" is something with a certain limit beyond which nothing is higher, but that pleasure cannot be the good because it has no limit. [( Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book 10)]

  19. To these men we say that pleasure does have a limit, for a man's life is like a vessel, and a man's limit of pleasure is reached when his vessel is filled with pleasure, and all pain which accompanies that pleasure is removed. [(Epicurus - Principal Doctrine 3, 18, 19, 20; Lucretius Book 6)]

  20. For when the pain of want is removed, bodily pleasure does not increase, and only varies. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 18)]

  21. Mental pleasure also has a limit, and this limit is reached when we reflect on the limits of the bodily pleasures, and the limits on the fears that cause the mind the greatest alarms. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 18)]

  22. For although the body itself knows no limits to the time required to fulfill its pleasures, the mind, intellectually grasping the goal and the limits of the flesh is capable of banishing all terror of the future, and of procuring a life that is complete in the knowledge that we have no need of unlimited time. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 20)]

  23. This is because the mind can grasp that if we measure the limits of pleasure through reason, unlimited time can afford no purer pleasure than limited time. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 3. 18, 19, 20)]

  24. But it is impossible for someone to dispel the pain of fear about the most important matters in life if he does not understand the nature of the universe, and if he gives credence to myths.[(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 49)]

  25. So for those who do not study nature, there can be no enjoyment of pure pleasure. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 49)]

  26. Other men argue that pleasure cannot be "the good" because the pleasant life is more desirable when Virtue is added. [(Aristotle - Nichomachean Ethics, Book 10)]

  27. These men say that if the addition of Virtue is better, then pleasure is not the good; for the good cannot become more desirable by the addition of anything to it. [(Aristotle - Nichomachean Ethics, Book 10)]

  28. But those who place the Good in Virtue are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of Nature. If they will simply listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  29. These men speak grandly about the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  30. We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  31. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired. But as it is, wisdom is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  32. We must therefore act to pursue those things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed towards attaining it. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  33. If the point at issue here involved only the means of obtaining happiness, and our enemies wanted to say "the virtues" - which would actually be true - we would simply agree without more ado. [(Diogenes of Oinoanda)]

  34. But the issue is not "what is the means of happiness," but "what is happiness itself and what is the ultimate goal of our nature." [(Diogenes of Oinoanda)]

  35. To this we say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that Pleasure is the end of the best way of life, while the virtues, which are messed about by our enemies and transferred from the place of the means to that of the end, are in no way the end in themselves, but the means to the end. [(Diogenes of Oinoanda)]

  36. But a great error has arisen among men in the mistaken idea of condemning pleasure and praising pain. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  37. For no one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  38. Nor again is there anyone who loves or pursues or desires pain itself, because it is pain, but because they see that circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure some great pleasure. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  39. For example, who among us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise except to obtain some advantage? [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  40. But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy pleasures that have no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resulting pleasure? [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  41. On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to follow. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  42. Equal blame belongs to those who fail in their undertakings through weakness of will, which is the same as saying that they shrink from toil and pain. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  43. But in a free hour, when our power of choice is unlimited, and nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  44. In certain emergencies, or owing to the claims of ordinary life, it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be postponed and annoyances accepted. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  45. The wise man always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects some pleasures to secure other and greater pleasures, and he endures some pain to avoid other and worse pains. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  46. And so question each of your desires, and ask: “What will happen to me if that which this desire seeks is achieved, and what if it is not?” [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 71)]

  47. All pleasure is good, because it is naturally pleasing to us, but not all pleasure should be chosen. And in the same way all pain is evil, and yet not all pain is to be shunned. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  48. It is by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  49. When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal, who indulges in an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts, revelry, sexual lust, and the delicacies of a luxurious table, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  50. Instead, we say that a pleasant life is produced by those thoughts and actions which we choose and avoid after we reason soberly, and after we banish those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  51. And we also say that mental pleasures and pains can be much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also aware of the past and of the future. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  52. Thus intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  53. This being the theory of Pleasure that we hold, why need we be afraid of not being able to reconcile it with the glorious exploits of our ancestors? We confidently assert that if they had a motive for the dangers that they braved in battle, that motive was not a love of virtue in and for itself. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  54. For when our ancestors braved great dangers before the eyes of their armies, they earned for themselves both the safety of their fellow citizens as well as honor and esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  55. And so we must act for ourselves to determine what to choose and avoid, and therefore the wise man scorns Fate, which some introduce as sovereign over all things. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  56. The wise man affirms that some things happen by necessity, others happen by chance, and others happen through our own agency. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  57. For the wise man sees that necessity destroys responsibility, and that chance is inconstant, but our own actions are autonomous, and it is to our own actions that praise and blame naturally attach. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  58. It would be better to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath the yoke of destiny which determinist philosophers have imposed. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  59. The legends of the gods at least hold out some faint hope that we may escape punishment, if we honor them, but the necessity of the determinist philosophers is deaf to all entreaties. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  60. Necessity is an evil; but there is no necessity for continuing to live with necessity, and if life is unendurable, we may serenely quit life's theater when the play has ceased to please us. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 9, Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  61. On the other hand, the man who has many good reasons for ending his own life is of very small account. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 38)]

  62. And this is because life is desirable, and those who say that it would be better never to have been born are the most foolish. For such men could easily depart from life if they truly believed what they were saying. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  63. As for us, we say that even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant, and not merely that which is longest. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  64. And we also say that the wise man does not hold Fortune to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the action of a god there is no disorder. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  65. The misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool, and it is better that what we judge to be good action not owe its success to the aid of chance. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  66. And that is why we regard independence of outward things to be a great good, not so that we in all cases will have little, but so that we will be content with little if we do not have much. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  67. This is because we are honestly persuaded that we have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury when we are least in need of it.[(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  68. To habituate oneself to a simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needed for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  69. This places us in a better condition to enjoy those times when we approach luxury, and renders us fearless of fortune. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  70. But there is also a limit in simple living, and he who fails to understand this falls into an error as great as that of the man who gives way to extravagance. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 63)]

  71. And likewise, to those men who say that emotion is to be avoided or repressed as a danger to the good life, we say that the wise man feels his emotions more deeply than do other men, and this is no hindrance to his wisdom. [(Diogenes Laertius - Book 10)]

  72. As we decide what it is we should choose and avoid, we must avoid the error of those men who spend their whole lives furnishing for themselves the things they think are proper to life, without realizing that each man at birth was poured a mortal brew to drink. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 30)]

  73. For every man passes out of life as if he had just been born, and the same span of time is both the beginning and the end of his greatest good. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 60, 42)]

  74. So remember that you have been born once and cannot be born a second time, and for all eternity you shall no longer exist. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 44)]

  75. You are not in control of tomorrow, so do not postpone your happiness, and waste your life by delaying, for each one of us dies without enjoying excess time. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 14)]

  76. But we should be grateful to Nature, because she has made the necessities of life easy to acquire, and she has made those things that are difficult to acquire unnecessary. [(Epicurus - Usener Fragment 469)]

  77. When misfortune comes, we should find solace in the happy memory of what has been, and in the knowledge that what has been cannot be undone. For the man who forgets his past blessings on that day becomes old. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 19, 55)]

  78. Remember also that of all the means which wisdom acquires to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is friendship. [(Epicurus - Principal Doctrine 27)]

  79. For friendship dances around the world, bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 52)]

  80. So at one and the same time we must philosophize, laugh, and manage our household and other business, while never ceasing to proclaim the words of true philosophy. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 41)]

  81. And as we proclaim this true philosophy, it is preferable to seem to speak in oracles that are of advantage to all men, even though no men understand us, rather than conform to popular opinion and thereby gain the constant praise that comes from the many. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 29)]

  82. So we must free ourselves from the prison of public education and politics, and hoist our sail and flee that which passes as culture. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 58; Epicurus - Usener Fragment to Pythocles1)]

  83. For the soul neither rids itself of disturbance, nor gains a worthwhile joy, through possession of great wealth, nor by the honor and admiration bestowed by the crowd, nor through any of the other things sought by unlimited desire. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 81)]

  84. The study of nature does not create men who are fond of boasting and chattering, or who show off the culture that impresses the many, but rather men who are strong and self-sufficient, and who take pride in their own personal qualities, not in those that depend on external circumstances. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 45)]

  85. And the greatest fruit of this self-sufficiency is freedom. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 77)]

  86. But in contrast to freedom, some men say that there is a single true law which applies universally to all men, and is unchanging and everlasting, and that this single law summons all to duty by its commands and averts all from wrong-doing by its prohibitions. [(Cicero - The Republic)]

  87. These men say that it is a sin to try to alter or repeal this law, and there should not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law for all nations and all times. [(Cicero - The Republic)]

  88. To these men of a single law, we say that there never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among particular men, at various times and places, to provide against infliction or suffering of harm. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 33)]

  89. And while we also say that justice is the same for all, as it is something found mutually beneficial in the dealings of men, justice differs in how it applies to particular places and circumstances, and the same thing is not necessarily just for everyone. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 36)]

  90. Whether a law is just depends on whether it is mutually advantageous, and this varies according to circumstances. A law ceases to be just when it is no longer advantageous for the mutual dealings of the citizens involved. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 37)]

  91. Thus the man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 39)]

  92. Where he finds even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is advantageous, excludes them from his life. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 39)]

  93. Yet some men indulge, without limit, their avarice, ambition, and love of power, to the extent that they must be restrained, rather than reformed. Therefore any means of obtaining protection from other men is a natural good. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 6)]

  94. Those who possess the power to defend themselves against threats by their neighbors, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee of security, live the most pleasant life with one another. [(Epicurus - Principle Doctrine 40)]

  95. And so let us remember that the most excellent and desirable life consists of living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures, of both body and mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain.[(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  96. To achieve this, we must possess a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain. We must know that death means complete unconsciousness. And we must know that pain is generally light, if long, and short, if strong. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  97. And we must have no dread of any supernatural power; nor must we ever allow the pleasures of the past to fade away, but we must constantly renew their enjoyment in our recollection. [(Torquatus - Cicero's On Ends)]

  98. Keep in mind all these things you have been taught, and you will escape far away from myth. Devote yourself to the study of first principles of Nature, and of infinity, and of the standards of choice and avoidance, and of the feelings of pleasure and pain, and of the highest goal for which we choose between them. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  99. For if you exercise yourself in these precepts, day and night, both by yourself, and with one who is like-minded, then never will you be disturbed. You will live as a god among men, for men lose all semblance of mortality when they live in the midst of immortal blessings. [(Epicurus - Letter to Menoeceus)]

  100. And then, when we do reach the end of our lives, we will say that we have anticipated you, Fortune, and entrenched ourselves against all your secret attacks.[(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 47)]

  101. And we will not give ourselves up as captives, to you or to any other circumstance, but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who vainly cling to it, we will leave life - crying aloud in a glorious song of triumph - that we have lived well. [(Epicurus - Vatican Saying 47)]


Our next section is "Examples of Epicurean Lives"